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Introduction
"In positing an evolutionary process wherein natural selection sorts among hereditary 
variations, Darwin identified variation as a centrally important fact of biological systems. In 
doing so, he broke with a 2000-year-old tradition that dominated Western thought. • • • In this 
philosophy of ESSENTIALISM, variation is accidental imperfection; only essences matter." 
(Futuyma 1998:6)
"In the past fifty years
, a number of philosophers and biologists have argued that species are 
not natural kinds with essences... They maintain that species essentialism is inconsistent with 
evolutionary theory and therefore should be abandoned." (Ereshefsky 2008: 101)
The quotations above, one taken from a textbook of evolutionary biology and the other 
from a handbook of philosophy of biology, represent the textbook narrative of one of 
the conceptual shifts brought about by Charles Darwin's evolutionary theory. The shift 
primarily concerns the principle of the classification of biological species (1). But given 
the importance of the species as a unit of evolution, it has more profound import for 
biology, or so it has been said. 
    Several biologistsand philosophers of biology are responsible for the articulation 
of the narrative mentioned above. Among them is the prominent biologist, Ernst Mayr. 
Mayr (1959:2) claimed that one of the contributions of Darwin's Origin of Species is the
(1) Hereafter the term "species" means biological species.
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replacement of "typological thinking (2) by population thinking," and that "[v]irtually 
every controversy in the field of evolutionary theory... was a controversy between a 
typologist and a populationist." As the quotations above indicate, Mayr's view has been 
accepted almost universally and has gained the status of the received view. 
     If the received view is reliable, we have a useful clue to understanding the 
historical background of the controversies in modern biology. My work-in-progress 
(Yamamoto 2011) employs Mayr's view to analyze the historical and conceptual 
backgrounds of the Lysenko controversy in Japan. There it is assumed that biologists 
trained in relatively old disciplines would show stronger resistance to the principles 
of modern evolutionary biology than those who were trained in younger disciplines, 
like genetics, since those younger disciplines are thought not to have had a strong 
association with typological thinking. However, recently some historians of biology, 
notably Mary P. Winsor, have presented a grave challenge to the received view. They 
insist that the received view is so flawed that it is to be regarded as a "story" (not 
history). Thus, they call the received view the "Essentialism Story." 
     In this note, I summarize the recent challenge to the received view and scrutinize 
its validity. Settlement of such a complex issue as this requires further historical 
survey into pre-Darwinian biology, which is beyond the scope of this piece. However, 
simply mapping out the points of debate will be of benefit to future discussion. In 
what follows, I first describe briefly what is (or is thought of as) essentialism and how 
the term was introduced to the biological community. Second, I summarize Winsor' 
s arguments against the "Essentialism Story." Thirdly, I analyze the received view 
to make clear what is thought of as the crucial difference between population and 
typological thinking, or essentialism. Finally, I argue that Winsor fails to capture what 
is thought of as the watershed brought about by the Darwinian theory of evolution. I 
conclude that, at the present time, we have good reasons to regard the received view 
as dependable. I also find that settlement of this issue requires further sociological 
inquiry into the biological community at large, not just into specific individuals, such 
as Winsor conducts. It seems that little scholarly effort has been invested in this line of
     
I I ' Mayr originally used the term "typologist thinking" to refer to the pre-Darwinian mode of 
thought. He later adopted the term "essentialism" as a synonym for "typological thinking." See Section 
1 for details. 
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investigation. I believe that this note contributes preliminary research on the historical 
sociology of the establishment of modern Darwinian biology.
1 The Received View Concerning Essentialism in Biology
     Traditionally, the concept of essence or essential property has been understood in 
the Lockean way. In John Locke's terminology, "real essence" (in contrast with "nominal 
essence") corresponds to the modern conception of essence. Locke's real essence is 
"a real, but unknown Constitution of their insensible Parts, from which flow those 
sensible Qualities, which serve us to distinguish them one from another" (Locke [1690] 
1975: 418). In science, this concept is closely related to the concept of "natural kinds," of 
which chemical elements are the paradigmatic example. For example, all members of 
the kind "gold" share a specific atomic structure, and no other chemical elements have 
the same structure. Thus, possession of that structure is essential for classification of 
an object as gold. That structure also accounts for other properties of gold; its color, its 
melting point, and so on. It seems that there is a general consensus that essence, or 
essential property, is a property or a set of properties that (1) all and only the members 
of a kind have, and (2) explains other properties typically observed in them (3). 
     Thus, essentialism in biology is construed as the position that everyspecies, or 
higher taxon, has an essence. It is this position that Mayr referred to as "typological 
thinking." Before looking at Mayr's discussion, let us look at a general explanation 
about why essentialism has no place in modern biology. According to Elliott Sober 
(2000: 151), "biologists do not think that species are defined in terms of phenotypic or 
genetic similarities. Tigers are striped and carnivorous, but a mutant tiger that lacked 
these traits would still be a tiger. ... Martian tigers would not be tigers, even if they 
were striped and carnivorous." An organism need not have specific properties to be 
a member of the species that it actually belongs to. The central reason why species 
are not defined in terms of similarities is the fact that organisms in nature have 
phenotypic and genetic variations to the extent that no two organisms are identical, 
even within a species. Darwin ([1859] 1998: 42, italics added) famously asserted that "I
' ~ I owe the summary here to Ereshefsky (2008: 101) and Okasha (2002: 194-5).
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look at the term species, as one arbitrarily given for the sake of convenience to a set of 
individuals closely resembling each other, and... it does not essentially differ from the 
term variety, which is given to less distinct and more fluctuating forms." 
     From the 1940s onward, Mayr maintained that recognition of this fact as the 
central issue that biologists deal with was Darwin's breakthrough. Mayr's attempt 
to incorporate Darwin's theory into taxonomy led him to abandon the traditional 
conception of species ("Morphological Species Concept" in his terminology) and to 
adopt his own concept of species, called the "Biological Species Concept." According 
to Mayr's new concept, species are not defined in terms of similarities. Instead, "[s] 
pecies are groups of actually or potentially interbreeding natural populations, which 
are reproductively isolated from other such groups" (Mayr [1942] 1999: 120). Suppose 
a group of organisms of a single species is geographically divided into two groups (for 
example, by an earth fissure), and the groups are then placed in ecologically different 
environments. According to Darwin's theory of natural selection, in such a situation 
members of each group will develop different traits and, after many generations, it is 
expected that members of one group will become unable to interbreed with members 
of the other. Under Mayr's concept of species, this event, called speciation, corresponds 
to the generation of a new species. Note that evolution is explained by variation 
among individuals within a group and environmental conditions. Mayr called this 
mode of thought "population thinking." Population thinkers claim that "all organisms 
and organic phenomena are composed of unique features and can be described 
collectively only in statistical terms" (Mayr 1959: 2). Mayr posits "typological thinking" 
in contraposition to population thinking. In typological thinking, Mayr (1959: 2) states, 
"there are a limited number of fixed, unchangeable 'ideas' underlying the observed 
variability... and the observed variability has no more reality than the shadows of an 
object on a cave wall." On the contrary, for the population thinkers "only the variation 
is real" (Mayr 1959: 2). 
    It is easy to grasp that Mayr had in mind Plato's theory of ideas when he 
characterized typological thinking as mentioned above. Against this background, David 
Hull introduced Karl R. Popper's criticism of essentialism. According to Popper, (1966: 
31) "methodological essentialism" is "the view, held by Plato and many of his followers, 
that it is the task of pure knowledge or 'science' to discover and to describe... the hidden 
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nature or Form or essence of things." And, "a description of the essences of a thing 
they all called a 'definition'." Hull (1965: 315) claims that "in no other science has there 
been as much empty verbiage about the meaning of 'species'." And although "Darwin 
supposedly put a stop to all that," "a spectre of essentialism continues to haunt the 
taxonomist" (Hull 1965: 315). Following Hull, presumably, Mayr brought the term 
"essentialism" into use as a synonym for "typological thinking" (cf. Mayr 1982: 4, 45-7). 
     Mayr's view has met with global acceptance. Thus, we find philosophers and 
biologists saying that "it is widely recognized that Darwin's theory of evolution 
rendered untenable the classical essentialist conception of species" (Dupr6 1999: 3), 
or "elements of the Aristotelian form of definition have persisted in modern biological 
taxonomy in that the names of taxa continue to be treated as if they are defined by 
lists of organismal characters" (de Queiroz and Gauthier 1990: 308).
2 Winsor's Challenge to the "Essentialism Story"
     After the turn of the century, doubts concerning the received view were raised. 
The leading figure is no doubt Winsor (2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2009) (1). Simply stated, she 
claims that the received view lacks historical evidence (so it is "story" not "history"), 
thus "the business about essentialism is the scholarly equivalent of an urban myth" 
(Winsor 2006a: 2). Winsor's approach is twofold: on one hand she offers historical 
evidence to undermine the received view, on the other hand she looks into "when, 
where, why, and by whom the essentialism story was first told" (Winsor 2006b: 151). 
Each subsection below addresses each dimension of her approach respectively.
2-1 The Independence of Methodology in Pre-Darwinian Biology 
    According to Winsor (2003: 389), "[m]uch of the literature relating essentialism 
to systematics is seriously flawed by the failure to separate ontology [world-view] and
       The ones offered by Winsor by no means exhaust the criticisms of the received view. For 
instance, Ros Amundson (2005) offers another criticism focusing on Mayr's and others' description of the 
historical relationship between embryology and modern evolutionary biology. Since a large proportion 
of Mayr s and other's narratives about essentialism concerns the characterization of the pre-Darwinian 
naturalists and this is the very topic that Winsor focuses on, I believe that Winsor is the central critic of 
the received view.
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epistemology [method]." Practical naturalists "had to deal with the ever-increasing 
number of kinds of seashells, butterflies, fruit, beasts and other natural wonders that 
were astounding European collectors" (Winsor 2006b: 150). Taxonomists of the day 
should not have had time to search for the hidden reality of essence (i.e., essentialist 
ontology). In reality, taxonomists' primal concern was to accommodate practically the 
considerable variability found in nature within their classification scheme. Instead 
of defining species in terms of essential properties, Winsor (2003: 390) argues that 
the taxonomists adopted the practice "to let a list, or cluster, of properties count as a 
definition without insisting that any particular property be always present." Suppose 
that there are three organisms (A, B, C) where A has properties p, q, not-r, while B has 
p, not-q, r, and C has not p, q, r. While two organisms do not have a set of properties in 
common, they are classified as members of one kind, where the minimum quorum is 
two. 
    Winsor (2003) offers evidence suggesting that in the 18th and 19th centuries 
normal taxonomic practice permitted using clusters of properties in definitions. First, 
in a botanical textbook published in the 19th century "each species or genus was 
linked to the next by clear similarities, but by the end of the chain all the characters 
of the first link had been lost" (Winsor 2003: 392). Second, Carl Linnaeus and 
Georges Cuvier, among others, adopted what Winsor (2003: 392) calls "the method of 
exemplars." According to this methodology, "a group could be created by association or 
agglomeration, each new member being judged similar to the exemplar in most of its 
characters, without any particular character of the exemplar being privileged" (Winsor 
2003: 392). Additionally, this kind of method was appraised by William Whewell, a 
prominent 19th-century philosopher of science, as a distinct practice beyond the reach 
of classical ogic (Winsor 2003: 394-6, 2006a: 3). 
     Winsor also calls our attention to Linnaeus's terminology. "The context, as well 
as his own definition, shows that the word [essentialis] only meant 'taxonomically 
useful' and nothing more" (Winsor 2006a: 5). Linnaeus's character of a genus "was the 
list or suite of features found to be dependable," and the adjective essentialis was "a 
single feature, or as few as possible, peculiar enough that it serves to distinguish this 
genus from the other genera." And "[t]he character essentialis was desirable because it 
enabled the production of a succinct catalog" (Winsor 2006a: 5). Given that there is no 
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direct evidence showing that Linnaeus acquainted himself with classical logic, "whether 
the concepts of scholastic logic played any role at all in the 18th century taxonomy... 
entirely remains to be demonstrated" (Winsor 2006a: 6). There, her thesis that the pre-
Darwinian taxonomists by no means idled their time away in metaphysical speculation 
is repeated.
2-2 The Creation of the "Essentialism Story" in Context 
    Winsor (2006b) investigates the background and trajectory of Mayr's writings 
on typological thinking and essentialism (5). It was in the mid-1950s, when Mayr was 
asked to organize a symposium of The American Association for the Advancement 
of Science (published as Mayr [1957]) and invited to a lecture of the Anthropological 
Society of Washington (published as Mayr [19591), that Mayr began to associate 
population thinking with Darwin. On those occasions it was not required for Mayr to 
conduct historical examination. "He was speaking and writing ex cathedra, from his 
position of eminence in science, and his historical claims were not submitted to peer 
review nor did he always supply full citations" (Winsor 2006b: 155). 
     To explain Mayr's move, Winsor refers to his contemplation of placing taxonomy 
in line with other branches of biology. "There is not the slightest doubt that Mayr' 
s readings, thoughts, and writings on history were undertaken for the service of his 
prime interest, the promotion of the modern evolutionary synthesis and, in particular, 
in support of his view that the process of speciation should hold the limelight in neo-
Darwinism" (Winsor 2006b: 155). Note that speciation plays a significant role in what 
Mayr calls population thinking. By giving speciation a central role in the theory of 
evolution, Mayr's new taxonomy would become an important part of the modern 
evolutionary synthesis (1), which meant that it would be regarded as a legitimate 
branch of modern biology. Mayr was motivated, Winsor indicated, by the low status of 
taxonomy in his day. "Trained in Berlin as a museum taxonomist in the 1920s, Mayr
     5) Actually , Winsor (2006b) deals with Hull and Arthur J. Cain as contributors to the creation 
of the "Essentialism Story" along with Mayr. But here I concentrate on Winsor s discussion of Mayr s 
writings, since she devotes many pages to it. 
     6) The modern evolutionary synthesis is the unification of the disciplines of biology that occurred 
in the 1940s and provides a general account of evolution on the basis of individual variation and natural 
selection.
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discovered when he came to New York in the 1930s that the leaders of academic biology 
considered the collection-based research he was doing to be little better than stamp 
collecting" (Winsor 2006b: 156). 
     These considerations strengthen Winsor's skepticism of the received view. 
Winsor (2006b: 170) concludes that "[s]imply putting Mayr's statements about typology 
in context was enough to make me doubt their soundness" (Winsor 2006b: 170).
3 Explicating the "Essentialism Story"
     Scrutinizing Winsor's arguments requires closer analysis of the received view, 
which has sometimes been stated vaguely and harshly. For example, suppose we read 
Mayr's (1959: 2) statement that "only the variation is real" quite literally. As Sober (1980: 
352) rightly points out, "[t]he Lotke-Volterra (sic) equations, for example, describe the 
interactions of predator and prey populations," (7) so "it would appear that much of 
population biology has its head in the clouds." On the other hand, before the advent 
of Winsor there is ample evidence showing that pre-Darwinian scholars, including 
Aristotle, attempted to explain the diversity found in nature. John Ramsbottom (1938) 
shows that Linnaeus had to give up his belief about the Creation when he thought 
he had discovered a new species, which arose through cross-species hybridization. 
Aristotle admitted the difficulty of drawing a boundary line in nature (Sober 1980: 
357). At first glance, these facts undermine the received view, but it must be noted that 
the supporters of the received view were not ignorant of these facts. Mayr (1957: 3) 
clearly states that "Linnaeus was too experienced a botanist to be blind to the evidence 
of evolutionary change." And Hull (1967: 312) points out that Aristotle "does not say 
that offspring are always of the same species as their parents... the production of 
another like itself is only the most natural act." These facts prompt us to examine more 
carefully what Mayr and others thought of the crucial difference between essentialism 
(or typological thinking) and population thinking.
     (7) The Lotka-Volterra equations are a pair of differential equations , each modeling the marginal 
rate of population growth of a population that interacts with the other in an ecosystem.
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3-1 Essentialism and Population Thinking as Explanations of Diversity 
    Sober (1980: 360) calls Aristotle's scientific thinking the "Natural State Model," 
and claims that this model "provides a technique for explaining the great diversity 
found in natural objects." For the sake of argument, let us turn our attention to the 
17th century and examine Newton's first law of motion, which states that the velocity 
of an object is constant unless acted upon by an unbalanced force. An object is in its 
natural state, according to Aristotle, when it is not being acted on by a force (i.e., at a 
constant velocity). Applied to biology, "[d]iversity was to be accounted for as the joint 
product of natural regularities and interfering forces" (Sober 1980: 361). Using this 
model, "the essentialist can countenance unlimited variety in, and continuity between, 
species, as long as underlying this plenum one can expect to find discrete natural 
tendencies" (Sober 1980: 363). Sober (1980: 363-4) offers some evidence that the Natural 
State Model was adopted in pre-Darwinian biology. 
     Departure from the Natural State Model is found, Sober argues, in the 
conception of variability in Francis Galton's work published in the late 19th century. 
According to Sober (1980: 368, 366), "Galton's discovery of the standard deviation gave 
him the mathematical machinery to begin treating variability as obeying its own laws," 
not as "deviation from type." This new way of treating variability clearly appears in the 
"law of ancestral heredity" that was formulated by Galton and reformulated by Karl 
Pearson (1898: 387), a proteg6 of Galton. The law states:
where K3 is the deviation of the sth mid-parent from the mean of the sth generation, 
and a8 is the standard deviation of the sth mid-parental generation. In other words, 
Galton and his successors "explained diversity in terms of an earlier diversity" 
(Sober 1980: 370). Sober takes as an example the norm of reaction, a graph which 
plots different phenotypic results as a function of environmental factors. Concerning 
different phenotypes, e.g., the height of rice plants, "[t]he Natural State Model 
presupposes that there is some environment for the genotype to be in," but "these 
presuppositions find no expression in the norm of reaction: all environments are on a 
par, and all phenotypes are on a par" (Sober 1980: 374). This recognition of a population 
as an independent entity is the key difference between typological and population
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thinking.
3-2 The Novelty of Population Thinking 
     According to Sober's view on population thinking, "[i]ndividual differences are 
not the effects of interfering forces... rather they are the cause of events" (1980: 371). 
But when one treats a population as an entity obeying its own laws, Sober (1980: 370) 
claims, "[t]he details concerning the individuals who are parts of this whole are pretty 
much irrelevant," and in this sense "population thinking involves ignoring individuals." 
Sober's analysis looks almost sound, but recent developments in population thinking 
concerning the discussion of cultural evolution (8) 8 reveal that there is more to be said. 
     Cultural evolutionists insist on the importance of cultural inheritance(e.g., 
learning from others) for the evolutionary explanation of human culture. They model 
cultural inheritance as replication of representations, ideas, technologies, and so 
on, using an analogy with gene replication. Some critics of the theories of cultural 
evolution argue that "unlike DNA replication, inferential processes 'transform' these 
representations during their transmission and reconstruction" (Henrich and Boyd 2002: 
88). Thus, it appears that the theories of cultural evolution cannot account for cultural 
inertia (the stability of some representations). In response to those criticisms, Henrich 
and Boyd (2002) formally demonstrate that even if the error rate is high in cases of 
cultural inheritance, cultural inertia can be realized (i.e., representations can be 
correctly replicated in the population). The assumption that they make when modeling 
replication dynamics is that individuals have an empirically established tendency 
called "conformist bias," i.e., "a tendency to adopt the more common representation" 
(Henrich and Boyd 2002: 100). It is correct that, as critics point out, individuals create 
poor replications, but the conformist bias can compensate for it. The critics' mistake 
is "to assume that the only process that can give rise [to] accurate replication at the 
level of the population is accurate replication at the level of individuals" (Henrich and 
Boyd 2002: 99-100). In a sense, Henrich and Boyd treat a population as an independent 
entity: a population can possess the property of stability, regardless of the stability of
     8) See, for example, Richerson and Boyd (2005: 5, 
population thinking and Darwin.
59) for cultural evolutionists' reference to
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individuals' minds. But equally important is that their discussion provides us with a 
new insight about the individuals. 
    Indeed, readers of social science literature will find nothing surprising in these 
discussions. Methodological individualists in social science, notably Friedrich A. Hayek, 
have argued that we should be cautious when inferring what occurs at the individual 
level from what occurs at the group level. Hayek (1944: 30) criticized that the mistake 
of collectivist theorists (of his day) was their inferring, "from the assertion that society 
is in some sense 'more' than merely the aggregate of all individuals", "that in order that 
the coherence of this larger entity be safeguarded it must be subjected to conscious 
control." Treating a population and the individuals constituting it as independent 
entities frees us from erroneous presuppositions about the individuals. Perhaps Sober 
overlooks or underestimates this benefit when he says that "population thinking 
involves ignoring individuals" (Sober 1980: 370) and when he suspects that models 
of cultural evolution will be of little interest to social scientists, stating that "these 
models concern themselves with the consequences of transmission systems and fitness 
differences, not with their sources" (Sober 1992: 18).
4 Rights and Wrongs of Winsor's Challenge
     The previous section examined where the key difference between typological and 
population thinking lies. Typological thinking is a mode of explanation that assumes 
the existence of a state unaffected by interfering forces. Thus, typologists explain 
variation in a population by reference to that state and interfering forces. Such a state 
lacking interference no longer has its own place in the populationist explanation. Now 
we have reached the point of scrutinizing Winsor's arguments. First, I briefly examine 
Winsor's argument about the background and the trajectory of Mayr's writings about 
essentialism, which is not directly related to the discussion in the previous section. It 
is accepted that the consideration of Mayr's motivation and the context in which he 
wrote the history of biology provides a good reason to make one doubt the soundness of 
his history. However, in light of the discussions about social epistemology s ), Winsor's
' See , for example, Kitcher (1993:Ch. 6). To put it crudely, social epistemology is the (descriptive
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(2006b: 168) conclusion that "structurally what is evident in the subsequent literature is 
that the story's authority simply grew with repetition" appears too hasty. Whether the 
originator of a doctrine is moved by non-epistemic factors is one thing, and whether the 
doctrine is justifiably accepted in the scientific community is another. Indeed, we looked 
at Sober's (1980) close analysis of the difference between typological and population 
thinking. Hull (1967) also cited the original texts of pre-Darwinian biology. 
     Next, let me examine Winsor's more substantial claims. Her claim that, in 
practice, pre-Darwinian taxonomists were concerned with practical matters is soundly 
based on historical evidence. But in light of Sober's argument, Winsor's discussion 
does not sufficiently support her global skepticism about the received view. The fact 
that the pre-Darwinian biologists were using clusters of properties in definitions 
does not undermine the received view. It is not only Sober who acknowledges that the 
pre-Darwinian biologists dealt with variation. Mayr (1957: 11-2) indicated that "[t] 
ypological thinking finds it easy to reconcile the observed variability of the individuals 
of a species with the dogma of the constancy of species." This shows that even the 
supporters of the received view recognized the fact that the pre-Darwinian biologists 
were detached from strict essentialism in practice. A charitable reading suggests 
that Mayr did not think that the boundary between typological and population 
thinking was marked by acceptance of the diversity in nature. In this regard, it is 
noteworthy that Hull (1994: 382) states that essentialists "acknowledge that entities 
in the natural world vary... but [for the essentialists] any variation from type is a 
deviation, and science deals primarily with regularities among typical individuals." 
It is the emancipation from this conception of variation, as Sober (1980) convincingly 
argued, that allowed biologists to treat a population as an entity of its own so that 
they could conceptualize the dynamics of populations as evolution in the modern 
sense. Indeed, Darwin wrote about Whewell that "[o]n my theory an 'exemplar' is no 
more wanted than to account for the likeness of members of one Family" (Darwin 
Archives, Volume 105.5, Item 143; quoted in Hull [1994: 383]) (10) . Separating ontology
or normative) study of the social dimensions of our acquiring knowledge. It studies, for example, how 
consensus is achieved in the scientific community, in a given institutional setting or group structure. 
While its central concern is philosophical, it integrates some insights from sociology of knowledge and 
sociology of science. See Goldman (2010) for a brief account. 
     (10) David N . Stamos (2005) offers a counter argument to Winsor, pointing out that Winsor's
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and epistemology, as Winsor does, should not mean downplaying the role of ontology. As 
Ingo Brigandt (2009: 86) suggests, "[i]n taxonomic contexts, where species and higher 
taxa are viewed as taxonomic units consisting of organisms sharing many biologically 
important characters, it is more natural to speak of taxa as natural kinds," whereas in 
"evolutionary contexts where species'.. are viewed as evolutionary units that originate
, 
undergo change, and go extinct," another conception of species is more favorable. 
Thus, how to conceptualize species does have an influence on how we can do well (for 
example, invent a better theory) in a given epistemic ontext. Winsor (2003: 397) admits 
that the "early naturalists must have given some idealistic meaning to their chains 
and exemplars," but she has some reservations, saying that they left the naturalness 
of their taxonomic ategories "as a fact of nature to be recorded without explanation." 
But if a change in the method of explanation is crucial to the conceptual shift towards 
population thinking, as it has been discussed so far, limiting our focus to biologists' 
practices will shed little light on the correctness of the received view. 
     These comments hould not be interpreted as downgrading the value of Winsor's 
challenge ntirely. It is true that the supporters of the received view often characterize 
essentialism or typological thinking so crudely that a quick look at their writings leaves 
readers with a misleading impression. The sentences "[t]he eidos of Plato is the formal 
philosophical codification of this form of thinking" and "the type (eidos) is real" (Mayr 
1959: 2) make it appear that biologists before Darwin were trapped in a cage of ancient 
metaphysics. In addition, it is easy to find a tendency to oversimplify and provoke 
when it is stated that "[t]he typologist stresses that every representative of a race has 
the typical characteristics of that race... All racist theories are built on this foundation" 
(Mayr 1959: 3). These expressions are no doubt prejudicial to the proper understanding 
of the situation. It is necessary to detect these defects and create an accurate picture. 
But we should be careful not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. In another 
article, Winsor (2009: 46, italics added) claims that "[m]ost narrators give taxonomy a
historical evidence only shows that the pre-Darwinian biologists used clusters of properties when they 
defined higher taxa. When they defined species, Stamos argues, they adopted the strictly essentialist 
method of definition. While this work is of great value for painting an accurate picture of pre-Darwinian 
biology, it seems that he fails to appreciate the important point suggested by Sober and others. Even 
if Winsor is correct at the species level, it remains possible that the biologists of the day adopted the 
essentialist explanation.
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rather inglorious role" in the development of Darwin's evolutionary theory while "the 
record shows overwhelmingly that taxonomy was the main factor causing Darwin to 
believe in branching evolution." In light of the discussion above, her complaint is not 
justified unless she clearly distinguishes what Darwin shared with the taxonomists 
of his day from what he did not. Although it is accepted that the taxonomy of his day 
provided Darwin with useful observations, what made Darwin's theory distinct might 
not be directly derived from taxonomic practices. The considerations so far suggest 
that Darwin and his predecessors parted company on how to explain those phenomena. 
While her claim that "[taxonomy's] past achievements should be accurately understood 
and appreciated" (Winsor 2009: 43) is fully agreeable, there is an unbridgeable 
gap between the claim and the statement that "the 'Essentialism Story' is at best 
exaggerated and possibly dead wrong" (Winsor 2009:46). 
     Certainly it is possible that Winsor's theses will prove to be correct and the 
received view will be abandoned in the last analysis (recall Derek Freeman's difficult 
challenge to Margaret Mead) ("). However, at the present stage, as long as we are 
concerned with the conceptual shift in the theories of evolution, we still have good 
reasons to support the received view, albeit without oversimplification or misguiding 
references to ancient or medieval metaphysics.
Conclusion
     In this note I have summarized and scrutinized Winsor's challenge to the 
received view, created by biologists and philosophers, which is accepted almost globally. 
The received view tells us that one of the important conceptual shifts brought about 
by Darwin's theory of evolution is the replacement of essentialism (or typological 
thinking in Mayr's terminology) with population thinking. Winsor's challenge sheds 
light on the fact that pre-Darwinian biologists were much more practical-minded 
than the term "Essentialism" leads us to imagine, and warns us that the typological/ 
population distinction may not be an adequate schema to understand the nature and 
development of Darwinian evolutionary theory. A close analysis of the ideas of the
     (") See Brown (1991: Ch . 1) for a brief summary. 
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creators of the received view reveals that Winsor fails to capture what was thought 
of as the watershed in biology of Darwin's day. The boundary line between typological 
and population thinking does not appear to lie in how biologists carved up the natural 
world with an incredible amount of variation. Rather, it concerns how the variation is 
explained. Thus, my conclusion is that we still have good reasons to regard the received 
view, in a modest form, as dependable. 
     Winsor's work is no doubt stimulating for the scholars of history, philosophy, and 
sociology of science. She brings to our attention the defects in the triumphant story of 
Darwinian theory. Sociological research into the biological community before and after 
the modern evolutionary synthesis will shed light on how those defects were produced 
and crystallized. Combined with further historical and conceptual investigation, that 
type of research will contribute to a more fine-grained picture of the development of 
evolutionary thought before and after Darwin. The debate must go on.
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Winsor's Challenge to the "Essentialism Story " in Biology
Kohei YAMAMOTO
     In this note, I summarize Mary P. Winsor's challenge to the received view 
concerning the conceptual development of evolutionary thought in biology, as 
established by Ernst Mayr and several biologists and philosophers, and scrutinize its 
validity. The received view states that one of the contributions of Darwin's Origin of 
Species is the abandonment of essentialism. Winsor and other critics of the received 
view insist that the received view is so flawed that it is to be regarded as a "story" (not 
history). 
     I first describe briefly what is (or is thought of as) essentialism, and how the 
term was introduced to the biological community. Second, I summarize Winsor's 
arguments against the received view. Thirdly, I analyze the received view to make clear 
what is thought of as the crucial difference between pre- and post-Darwinian biology. 
Finally, I argue that Winsor fails to capture what is thought of as the watershed 
brought about by the Darwinian theory of evolution. I conclude that, at the present 
time, we have good reasons to regard the received view as dependable.
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